Cognitive conflict plays an important role in tuning cognitive control to the situation at hand. Based on earlier findings that have demonstrated emotional modulations of conflict processing, we predicted that affective states may adaptively regulate goal-directed behavior that is driven by conflict. This hypothesis was tested by measuring conflict-driven control adaptations following experimental induction of four different mood states that could be differentiated along the dimensions arousal and pleasure. After mood states were induced, 91 subjects performed a flanker task, which provides a measure of conflict adaptation. As predicted, pleasure level impacted conflict adaptation: less pleasure was associated with more conflict-driven control.
Introduction
Emotions seem to have evolved to guide organisms and their conspecifics in their struggle for survival and affective states are assumed to facilitate behavior that is adaptive to the current situational context (Morris, 1992) . In particular, it has been suggested that negative mood stimulates the processing of stimuli that have a negative valence and, therefore, deserve priority.
Indeed, low pleasure levels seem to induce negative information biases in attention and memory.
Although it has been suggested that these biases systematically change the way people cope with negative events (cf. Gendolla, 2000) , it has yet to be demonstrated how affect may play this regulating role in cognitive control adaptations.
The main function of cognitive control is to adapt the cognitive system to situational demands. It has been proposed that this adaptation is driven by the detection of cognitive conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001) . Evidence supporting this view comes from conflict tasks. On a given trial, subjects respond slower to target information if distracting flanker information suggests a different response. On trials following this conflict, however, flanker interference is reduced (Egner, 2007; Gratton et al., 1992) , indicating that facing conflict enhances control (Botvinick et al., 2001) .
Numerous studies have shown that low-pleasure affect facilitates neural conflict monitoring (e.g., Luu et al., 2000) . They illustrate that moods that are congruent with the negative valence inherent to conflict (Botvinick, 2007) facilitate conflict registration (cf. Rusting, 1998) . Given that conflict registration is important for tuning goal-directed behavior (cf. Kerns et al., 2004) , affective states that prioritize conflict processing should also induce stronger behavioral adaptations to cognitive conflict. We therefore predict that people in a low-pleasure mood adapt more strongly to cognitive conflict, and are thus more likely to recruit control, than people in a high-pleasure mood. Some authors have postulated that, independent of pleasure, changes in arousal level may also influence conflict-adaptation by altering the signal-to-noise ratio of conflict information (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009) . If so, conflict-driven cognitive control may be influenced by the arousal level of the current affective state. (FOOTNOTE 1).
Given that pleasure level and arousal level are the two fundamental dimensions mood is assumed to vary on (Yik et al., 1999) , we investigated four groups of participants who underwent a standard mood-induction manipulation before performing a conflict-evoking flanker task. Each mood group occupies one of the four quadrants derived by crossing the dimensions of pleasure and arousal (see Figure 1 ; cf. Jefferies et al., 2008) . The four derived moods that were induced were: anxiety (low pleasure, high arousal), sadness (low pleasure, low arousal), calmness (high pleasure, low arousal), and happiness (high pleasure, high arousal). As pointed out, we predicted stronger conflict-driven adaptation effects (i.e., reductions of flanker-induced interference after conflict trials) for participants with low pleasure levels (anxious and sad participants) than for participants with high pleasure levels (calm and happy participants).
Methods

Participants and design
Ninety-eight students participated either for payment or course credits (18-30 years old; 24 males; 11 left-handed). They were randomly assigned to one of the four mood induction groups where anxious, sad, calm, and happy moods were induced. Data from seven subjects were excluded from analyses because of response omissions on more than 20% of the trials (2), chance level task performance (3), or incompliance with instructions (2).
Mood induction and assessment
A standard mood-induction procedure was used that combined music with imagination. This is known to induce reliable mood changes (Eich, 2007) . Subjects used a headphone to listen to specific classical music samples which were validated by previous research (Jefferies et al., 2008) . They were instructed to develop a particular mood by imagining and writing down a mood-appropriate event in detail, either by using the written vignette given or by recalling a similar event from their past. Music continued to play during task performance. In order to check the induction manipulation, subject were to rate their mood on a 9 x 9 pleasure x arousal grid (Russell et al., 1989) . Ratings (reported as values ranging from -4 to 4) were given on a grid occasionally presented on the computer monitor during the experiment.
Task
We used a version of the classic flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) where centrally presented target stimuli are vertically flanked on either side by two response-compatible or response-incompatible stimuli. Four Dutch color words were used as targets and flankers (using a word set including "brown", "gray", "yellow", and "red", or "purple", "green", "orange", and "blue"). Subject were instructed to use their index fingers, making a left response to two specific central target words and a right response to the other two target words (stimulus-response mapping counterbalanced within mood groups). A reminder of the stimulus-response mapping was shown for 15 seconds before the start of each of the two blocks of 72 trials. All trials started with a fixation cross (randomly varying intervals of 800, 1000, or 1100 ms), followed by the stimulus, which was presented until response registration or, in the case of omission, for 1500 ms. In half of the trials target and flanker stimuli would call for different responses (responseincompatible condition; I) whereas in the other half physically identical target and flanker stimuli would call for the same response (response-compatible condition; C). All trials were presented in an unconstrained random sequence. Stimuli appeared in black lower-case in Arial bold font (3.5 cm wide and 5.4 cm high for the entire array) and were presented on a grey background.
Participants viewed the stimuli on a 17" monitor from ≈ 60 cm.
Procedure
After giving informed consent, subjects were instructed about the mood rating and how to perform the task. Instructions emphasized both speed and accuracy. Following 16 practice trials, and a 10-minute mood-induction, subjects performed a flanker task block, which was repeated after a short 3-minute mood-booster with identical instructions. The flanker-task blocks were interleaved with blocks of a manual color-word Stroop task (FOOTNOTE 2). The order of tasks was counterbalanced within mood conditions. Following completion of a questionnaire in which subjects were asked to rate how genuinely they had experienced their mood (9-points scale), subjects were instructed to return to baseline mood levels. Negative mood subjects received a candy to facilitate mood compensation. During the experiment, nine mood ratings were obtained at the following time points: at the beginning of the experiment (baseline), following the practice trials, halfway and at the end of the mood-induction procedure, after the first half of the task, following the mood booster, after the second half of the task, following the questionnaire, and at the end of the experiment.
Data analysis
ANOVAs were used to test our hypotheses. Arousal and pleasure grid ratings served as a mood-manipulation check. Absolute and interference (I minus C) measures of correct reaction times (RT) and error rates were analyzed as a function of mood condition. Standard conflictadaptation effects, both for RT and error rates, were calculated by subtracting the interference effect following a correct conflict (i) trial from the interference effect following a correct no-conflict (c) trial (i.e., (cI -cC) -(iI -iC)). The first trial of each block (1.4%) and trials not complying with the outlier criterion (2 SDs; 4.7%) were excluded from all analyses.
Results
Mood induction manipulation check
Participants started in a slightly positive (M = 0.59, SE = 0.14) and slightly aroused (M = .15, SE = 0.16) mood. Baseline ratings did not differ between the assigned pleasure and arousal mood groups (F(1,87)s < 1.70). Participants reported the expected change in arousal and pleasure level following mood induction. Average self-reported affect during task performance (ratings given at the begin and end of tasks blocks; i.e. at time points 3 through 6, see Table Eich, 2007) , subjects judged their reported moods as genuine at the end of the task (M = 7.0, SE = 0.14) and this rating did not depend on mood condition (F(3,87) = 2.69). Across mood conditions, comparisons between ratings given at baseline and at the end of task performance suggest that the task itself induced some pleasure lowering (F(1,90) = 7.78, MSE = 2.30, p < .01) but no change in arousal (F(1,90) < 1).
Mood and conflict-adaptation effects
Reliable overall RT conflict-adaptation effects (F(1,87) = 16.83, p < .001, MSE = Mood and adaptation 8 2303.02) were observed for the flanker task and, as Figure 1 shows, this effect was modulated by pleasure level (F(1,87) = 4.241, p < .05, MSE = 2303.02). This predicted effect of pleasure was not accompanied by an arousal or pleasure x arousal interaction effect (F(1,87)s < 1). Overall interference effects were smaller if conflict was experienced on the previous trial (21 ms vs. 42 ms) and, as predicted, these conflict-driven interference reductions were larger for subjects in a low pleasure mood (anxious and sad group; M = 29, SE = 9.4 and M = 33, SE = 10.5) than for subjects in a high pleasure mood (happy and calm group; M = 8, SE = 10.5 and M = 13, SE = 10.0). This effect could not be accounted for by mood-induced differences in overall RT or interference effects (F(1,87)s < 2.23; see Table 2 , for details). Correlations between self-reported affect during task performance and individual conflict-adaptation effects across mood groups were not significant (pleasure: r = -.161, p = .13; arousal: r = -.134, p = .21).
Conflict-adaptation effects for error rates were not reliable (F(1,87) = 3.13; see Table 2 ).
Overall interference effects in error rate (F(1,87) = 10.03, p < .01, MSE = .002) were not modulated by mood condition (F(1,87)s < 1.57), though subjects with low pleasure levels (F(1,87) = 6.741, p < .05, MSE = .004) and subjects with high arousal levels (F(1,87) = 4.267, p < .05, MSE = .004) made slightly more errors in general.
Discussion
This study provides substantial evidence for the hypothesis that conflict-adaptation is sensitive to modulations in pleasure level. After a successful mood manipulation, both sad and anxious people showed stronger adaptation following conflict trials than people in a happy or calm mood (see Figure 1 ). This effect was not accompanied or modulated by effects of arousal level; subjects with high-activation moods (anxious and happy) did not show differences in conflict-adaptation effects in comparison to subjects in a low-activation mood (sad and calm).
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These findings thus suggest that affect helps to regulate goal-directed behavior in response to cognitive conflict Our observations show an interesting parallel to the seminal work of Festinger (1957) We believe that our findings may also provide insight into the way cognitive control processes are impaired in psychopathological samples. Mood disorders like depression and anxiety have been associated with stronger biases to negative events (Leppanen, 2006) . Indeed, sensitized conflict-monitoring processes have been observed for internalizing mood disorders (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008) . Whether conflict-driven adaptations are changed as well in these people has to be investigated yet, because mood-disorder studies using cognitive control measures usually overlook conflict-adaptation effects, reporting main interference effects only (but cf. Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007) .
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Altogether, our findings suggest that conflict-driven control adaptations are highly dependent on one's emotional state, with pleasure level being more important than arousal level.
Our results demonstrate that the influence of affect is not limited to conflict processing per se but modulates subsequent behavioral adaptation as well. This suggests that emotions and/or affective states are not only highly important in biasing perception and signaling environmental conflict, but also in adaptively regulating goal-directed behavior.
1. Recent work has suggested a relationship between pleasure increases and shifts towards more flexible behavior at the cost of goal maintenance (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004 ).
The hypothesis that pleasure level reduces conflict adaptation is in line with such a framework because conflict adaptation facilitates task maintenance at the cost of flexible switching (e.g. Notebaert & Verguts, 2008) . Cumulating evidence suggest a role of neurotransmitter modulation in these effects. For example, pharmacological studies suggest that raised tonic dopamine levels reduces phasic dopamine responses to conflict (for a review, see Jocham & Ullsperger, 2009 ).
However other neurotransmitter systems involved in mood changes (e.g. serotonin and norepinephrine) may also play a role (Posner et al., 2005) . The mutual interactions and causal role of these systems is complex and remains a hot topic for future investigation.
2. We could not use reaction-time data from this task to test our hypothesis, given that no overall conflict-adaptation effect was observed (F(1,87) = 1.37). As expected, mood effects on this measure were not observed (F(1,87)s < 2.31). In line with the data reported, this task did produce a reliable interference effect (F(1,87) = 70.60, p < .001), which was not modulated by mood (F(1,87)s < 1).
Task-specific characteristics like task difficulty may account for differences in the size of conflict-adaptation effects (e.g. Fischer et al., 2008) . In a new series of experiments including a Stroop and a flanker paradigm similar to those used in the current study, we indeed demonstrate that high task-demands eliminate conflict-adaptation effects (to be published elsewhere). 
